What if a successful company starts to receive a torrent of lowvalued (one or two stars) recommendations in its mobile apps from multiple users within a short (say one month) period? Is it legitimate evidence that the apps have lost quality, or an intentional plan (via lockstep behavior) to steal market share through defamation? In case of a systematic attack to one's reputation, it might not be possible to manually discern between legitimate and fraudulent interaction in the immense universe of possibilities of userproduct recommendation. Previous works have focused on this issue, but none of them has considered the context, modeling, and scale that we work with in this paper. We propose one novel method named Online-Recommendation Fraud ExcLuder (ORFEL) to detect defamation and/or illegitimate promotion of online products using vertex-centric asynchronous parallel processing of bipartite (users-products) graphs. With an innovative algorithm, our results demonstrate efficacy -detecting over 95% of potential attacks; and efficiency -at least two orders of magnitude faster than the stateof-the-art. Over our new methodology, we introduce three contributions: (1) a new algorithmic solution; (2) a scalable approach; and (3) a novel context and modeling of the problem, which now addresses both defamation and illegitimate promotion. Our work deals with relevant issues of the Web 2.0, potentially augmenting the credibility of online recommendation to prevent losses to both customers and vendors.
INTRODUCTION
In the Web 2.0, it is up to the users to provide content, including photos, text, and recommendations, among other user-generated information. In this universe, the more interaction (likes, recommendation, comments, ...) a product page or a user profile gets, co-citation, social network interaction, and search-engine optimization. This is not a new problem, so we use in this paper the definition of lockstep behavior of Beutel et al. [4] (see Section 3.1).
The task of identifying locksteps is straightly modeled as a graph problem in which we want to detect near-bipartite cores considering some given time constraint. The bipartite cores correspond to groups of users that interacted with groups of products within limited time intervals. One lockstep can refer to defamation, when the interactions refer to poor (low-valued) recommendations; or to illegitimate promotion, when the recommendations are high. As so, the problem generalizes to finding near-bipartite cores with edges whose weights correspond to the rank of the recommendations. It is important to note that we want to solve the problem without any previous knowledge about suspicious users, products, nor moments when the frauds occurred.
This work goes deeper into the problem of lockstep identification, extending the state-of-the-art of previous solutions by means of the following contributions:
1. Novel algorithmic paradigm: we introduce the first vertex-centric algorithm able to spot lockstep behavior in Web-scale graphs using asynchronous parallel processing; vertex-centric processing is a promising paradigm that still lacks algorithms specifically tailored to its modus operandi;
2. Scalability and accuracy: we solve the problem for billionscale graphs, in one single commodity machine, achieving efficiency that is comparable to that of cluster-based former works, whilst we achieve the same efficacy;
3. Generality of scope: we solve the problem for real weighted graphs ranging from social networks to e-commerce recommendation, extending the state-of-the-art of lockstep semantics to discriminate defamation and illegitimate promotion.
This paper follows a traditional organization: in Section 2, we review related works; in Section 3, we describe our proposal; in Section 4, we report our experimental results, including real data analyses; in Section 5 we discuss further applications; and in Section 6 we conclude the paper.
RELATED WORKS

Clustering
The identification of lockstep behavior refers to the problem of partitioning both the rows and columns of a matrix, which is known as co-clustering or bi-clustering. Some authors have worked on similar variations of the bi-clustering problem. For example, Papalexakis and Sidiropoulos used PARAFAC decomposition over the ENRON e-mail corpus [23] ; Dhillon et al. used information theory over word-document matrices [7] , and Banerjee et al. used Bregman divergence for predicting missing values and for compression [3] . Other applications include gene-microarray analysis, intrusion detection [22] , natural language processing, collaborative filtering [15] , and image, speech and video analysis. Note that, in this problem setting, whenever time is considered in the form of time windows to be detected, we have a Non-deterministic Polynomial-time (NP-hard) problem [2] that prevents the identification of the best solution even for small datasets. In fact, we deal with issues fundamentally different from the problems proposed so far, which, according to Kriegel et al. [14] , are not straightly comparable due to their specificities. Theoretically, our work resembles the works of Gupta and Ghosh [10] and of Crammer and Chechik [6] ; similarly, we use local clustering principles but, differently, we are not dealing with one-class problems. Besides, the core of our technique is a variant of mean-shift clustering [5] , now considering temporal and multi-dimensional aspects. As we mentioned before, our contribution relates not only to performance, but also to a novel algorithmic approach.
Web suspicious behavior detection
Many previous works use graph theory to detect suspicious behavior on the Web. This is the case of algorithm Crochet [24] that aims at identifying quasi-cliques based on an innovative heuristic; and also the case of MultiAspectForensics [19] that uses tensor decomposition to detect patterns within communities, including bipartite cores. In another work, Eigenspokes [25] uses singularvalue decomposition to detect unexpected patterns in phone call data; meanwhile, Netprobe [21] uses belief propagation to find near bipartite cores in e-commerce graphs. However, none of the previous works focuses on performance at the same scale that we do; furthermore, these previous works do not consider the same problem with which we work, that is, the detection of a set of users fraudulently interacting with the same set of products at around the same time. In fact, the closest approach to our work is the CopyCatch algorithm [4] , which solves the unweighted problem in a parallel, distributed setting -its experimental results reported considered one thousand machines. In this work we introduce a vertex-centric asynchronous parallel algorithm that works in one single commodity machine and whose performance rivals to what is reported in this former work, still achieving similar accuracy rates.
Vertex-centric graph processing
We use in this paper what is called vertex-centric processing [18] . Given a graph G = (V, E) in which the vertices are labeled from 1 to |V |, we associate a value to each vertice and to each edge -for a given edge e = (u, v), u is the source and v is the target. With values associated to vertices and edges, vertex-centric processing corresponds to the graph scan approach depicted in Algorithm 1. The values are determined according to the computation that is desired, e.g., Pagerank or belief propagation; we illustrate it with hypothetical functions f and g in the algorithm. Evidently, a single scan is not enough for most useful computations, therefore the graph is scanned as many times as necessary for convergence. Graph processing, then, becomes what is defined in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 1 Vertex-centric graph processing procedure GRAPH_SCAN(GRAPH G) their strategy demands the graph to be entirely in memory, otherwise they would be prohibitively costly due to repeatedly random accesses to disk. On the other hand, the vertex-centric processing is limited to problems solved along the neighborhoods of the vertices (or with cleaver adaptations to such constraint); the good point is that it is adherent to disk-based processing, since it can suitably rely on sequential accesses to the disk. This kind of processing is not only prone to disk-based processing, but also to parallel processing according to which, each thread can be responsible for a different share of the vertices. This possibility yields to quite effective algorithms.
Asynchronous Parallel Processing
Many research groups have introduced systems devoted to largescale graph processing based either on vertex-centric or edgecentric processing; this is the case of systems Pregel [18] , Pegasus [13] , PowerGraph [9] , and GraphLab [17] . However, such works are parallel-distributed, and thus, they demand knowledge and management of costly computational clusters. More recently, a novel paradigm emerged in the form of frameworks that rely on asynchronous parallel processing, including systems GraphChi [15] , TurboGraph [12] , X-Stream [26] and MMap [27] . Such systems use disk I/O optimizations and the neighborhood information of nodes/edges in order to set up algorithms that can work in asynchronous parallel mode; that is, it is not required that their threads advance synchronously along the graph in order to reach useful computation. This approach has demonstrated successful to solve many problems, such as Pagerank, connected components, shortest path, and belief propagation, to name a few. Here we use vertexcentric graph processing over framework GraphChi; however, our algorithm can be adapted to any of the frameworks seen so far.
METHODOLOGY
Problem formulation
In this section we provide a mathematical description of the lockstep problem. As mentioned in Section 1, we generalize the lockstep detection problem, amplifying its scope to defamation and illegitimate promotion. We do it by considering the weights of the edges, which correspond, for instance, to the numeric evaluation a user gave to a product on a recommendation website. Table 1 lists the symbols and definitions of our notation.
Following we present the concept of a lockstep or, formally, a temporally-coherent near bipartite core. Definition 1. A set of products P and a set of users U comprise an [n, m, ∆t, ρ]-temporally-coherent near bipartite core if there exists P i ⊂ P for all i ⊆ U such that:
In other words, we have a suspicious lockstep if we find a set of products P that was recommended by a set of users U within a ∆t time window; we relax this definition with parameter ρ, which states that we also have a lockstep if we partially (ρ percentage) satisfy this definition. Note that what makes the problem NP-hard, and challenging, is the temporal factor; also note that the problem refers to reducing the search space of frauds by pointing out suspiciousness, which can turn out to be actually fraudulent, or not.
Given this formulation, we consider the weight of the edges (recommendations) to define the concepts of defamation -shown in Equation 6 , and illegitimate promotion -shown in Equation 7 .
Finally, we consider the problem as an optimization problem, whose objective is to catch as many suspect users as possible, while only growing P until we satisfy parameter m. In Equation 8, we describe our objective function according to which we want to find U[c] and P[c] to maximize the number of users and their interactions for a given cluster c.
where
Equations 11 and 12 refer to our definitions of illegitimate promotion and defamation, while Equation 9 shows how we incorporate these weight constraints in the general problem, through the definition of a threshold function λ .
ORFEL algorithm
In order to find locksteps, we propose the Online-Recommendation Fraud ExcLuder (ORFEL), one novel, iterative algorithm that follows the idea of vertex-centric processing introduced in Section 2.3. Each iteration executes two functions: updateProducts and updateUsers that, respectively, will add/remove products and users from a lockstep that is being constructed. The algorithm iterates until convergence -that is, when sets P and U stabilize for all the locksteps that were identified, presenting insignificant changes between iterations. The full pseudo-code of ORFEL is in Algorithm 3.
Initialization
The algorithm relies on seeds to search the data space; the idea is to have each seed inspecting its surroundings looking for one local maximum. One seed in the algorithm corresponds to one potential lockstep, which comprises a set of products and a set of users. Therefore, the initial seeds correspond to minimum locksteps, that is, one single product, and a few (≥ 1) usersthe only requirement to the initial set of users is that it cannot be an empty set. The initialization randomly chooses products of the dataset, each one corresponding to one seed. Then, for each product (seed), ORFEL randomly chooses a constant small number of users that recommended this product. This is necessary so that the algorithm has initial elements -P[i] and U[i] for every ith-lockstep -scattered throughout the search space. After setting up these initial locksteps the algorithm will iteratively have them grow in number of products and users.
Product update
In the updateProducts function we only consider vertices that are products, what means that changes are made only in set P[i]. This function is called for every product testing if this product fits in one of the locksteps; the test is performed for all locksteps. One product enters a given lockstep if at least ρ percent of the users currently in the lockstep recommend that product within a ∆t time window. Also, the algorithm only considers recommendations that fit the given weight constraint (represented by the λ function) when accounting for the percent of users that recommend the candidate product, characterizing it as either defamation or illegitimate promotion.
Additionally, when a lockstep already has m products, that is, it has already achieved the maximum number of products per lockstep, we test if it is worth to swap a product currently in the lockstep for the candidate product. This test is similar to the one used to add a product, except that, to be swapped, now the candidate product must contain a superset of the set of recommendations that the current product has. This is an heuristic approach that leads to an additional coverage of the search space because, as we look for supersets of recommendations, the locksteps tend to increase in size.
User update
In turn, function updateUsers considers only vertices that are users; changes are made only to set U [i] . Similarly to what is done in the updateProducts step, we update each lockstep separately by testing if the current user can be added to it. A candidate user will enter a lockstep if it recommends at least ρ percent of the products in the cluster within a 2δt time window of each of the products' time centers -that is, the average recommendation time on that product inside the lockstep -and if it fits the desired weight constraint. If the candidate user fills the requirement it is added to that lockstep. It is important to note that in this step we allow users that are outside of the actual δt time window (we propose to use 2δt, following the empirical evidence of both our work and the state-of-the-art approach) to enter the lockstep; this is the mechanism that drives the lockstep towards a better local maximum, in the case that there exists one.
End iteration
Finally, once the updateUsers step is complete, we must run function endIteration. In this step, for all locksteps, the algorithm sorts the 2∆t recommendations by their time stamp and scans this set sequentially looking for the subset that maximizes the recommendation criterion (number of recommendations); the desired subset must fit a ∆t window. This is the core mechanism of the algorithm; what it does is to let a 2∆t time window to take place first, then, from the corresponding set of recommendations, it selects a subset that maximizes the desired criterion. This mechanism is what makes the seeds "inspect" their 2∆t neighborhoods. If the recommendation set changes, a new iteration will lend new products and users to enter/swap into the lockstep, until convergence. Once a seed finds a local maximum, it gets stuck and does not change anymore.
Note that some seeds will converge sooner than others, getting stuck to locksteps smaller that the m and n parameters. These seeds are considered dead (no alterations between iterations) and are ignored by the algorithm. This occurs right after the second iteration, after which the number of locksteps (live seeds) becomes smaller than the number of initial seeds. The algorithm converges when all the seeds are dead.
Discussion about the parameters
As shown in Algorithm 3, ORFEL has five parameters: m, n, ρ, ∆t and nSeeds. The first two, m and n, refer, respectively, to the cardinality of products and users that the algorithm must verify when evaluating suspicious locksteps. Parameter ρ is the acceptable percentage (the tolerance fraction) of products (ρ * m) for the algorithm to state that a bipartition is in fact suspicious. Although one could change the ρ value, we suggest using no less than 80%, otherwise the locksteps could degenerate. Parameter ∆t defines the time window within which the interactions (recommendations) should take place. Parameter nSeeds refers to the number of seeds that the algorithm will spread through the data universe, each one searching for one suspicious lockstep.
Parameters m and n define the aspects of the suspect behavior that we are considering. Raising the value of m or n means that we want to search for suspect behaviors involving more products and/or users. Talking about m and n relates to what we call "AttackSize", that is, the dimensions of the potential attacks that we presume to exist. These parameters filter out attacks that are too small and/or too big, what may be desired depending on the domain. In the section of experiments, we evaluate how different configurations of AttackSize impact the efficacy of our algorithm. Parameter ρ makes the algorithm flexible to different sizes of attacks, including attacks in which the users attack only a fraction (percentage) of the expected number of products, m, in the locksteps. In practice parameters ρ informs the algorithm to have a tolerance around m and n. These parameters, along with ∆t, depend on the semantics of the problem's domain.
Parameter ∆t defines the timespan desired by the analyst when searching for attacks. For instance, let's say we are searching for attacks in a social network; we could argue that a timespan as big as a couple hours is enough to find ill-intended interactions. On the other hand, if we are talking about online reviews, one could think of one week. The same reasoning can be used to define parameters m and n.
Finally, parameter nSeeds controls ORFEL's potential of discovery; as we demonstrate in the experiments, the bigger the data, the bigger must be the number of seeds following a linear correlation.
Convergence
Our algorithm focuses on finding a set of local maxima for the objective function defined in Equation 8 , which is bounded because there is a limited set of users and products. With a bounded func- tion, therefore, convergence depends solely on the behavior of steps updateProducts, updateUsers and endIteration.
First, we note that in step updateProducts the algorithm checks if a given product can be added to any of the current locksteps, deciding to include or swap that product only if it covers more recommendations than before. As result, our objective function only improves -or stays the same -after the updateProducts step. Meanwhile, step updateUsers attempts to add suspect users to existing locksteps by extending the size of the time-window, and step endIteration makes sure that only the biggest set of users that fit in the best ∆t time-window are added to the lockstep. Therefore, these steps can only improve our objective function by including more users, or leaving it unaltered if no users are added. These observations permit us to conclude that, in our algorithm, the locksteps grow asymptotically, eventually reaching a local maximum that prevents changes between two iterations. Besides this theoretical exercise, in Section 4, we empirically demonstrate the convergence of ORFEL.
EXPERIMENTS
Experimental setting
We implemented ORFEL using Java 1.7 over the GraphChi platform as stated in Section 2.4. We ran our experiments on an i7-4770 machine with 16 GB of RAM, and 2TB 7200RPM HDD; for the SSD tests, we used a 240GB drive with I/O at 450MB/s. For full reproducibility, the complete experimental set is available at www.icmc.usp.br/pessoas/junio/ORFEL/index.htm, including source codes and graph/lockstep generators.
As for the datasets 1 , we considered two real world graphs: Amazon.FineFoods and Amazon.Movies. Both datasets comprise user-product recommendation data from the Amazon website; the first one refers to the fine foods product section and the second one contains reviews of movies. Also, we had the timestamp of each review and its numeric evaluation ranging from 1 to 5. We also used synthetic datasets so to generalize the scope of our tests. We use a bipartite graph generator that works based on the G nmk model available on NetworkX [11] , in which n stands for the number of nodes in the first bipartite set; m stands for the number of nodes in the second bipartite set; and k is the number of randomly generated edges connecting both sets. Table 2 lists the two Amazon datasets plus the synthetic dataset Synthetic.C, which was generated using n = 2, 000, 000, m = 8, 000, 000 and k = 100, 000, 000. Additionally, we generated benchmark datasets that are larger versions of dataset Synthetic.C; they were used for scalability tests, as we describe in Section 4.4.
Experimental goals
The main feature expected from ORFEL is the ability to detect lockstep attacks, either of defamation or of illegitimate promotion. As mentioned in Section 2.1, this is an NP-hard problem that we approximately solve via an optimization approach. Considering these aspects, we verify the correctness in Section 4.2, the efficacy (i.e., the ability to find the majority > 95% of the lockstep attacks) in Section 4.3, the efficiency (i.e., the ability to reach efficacy within desired time constraints) in Section 4.4, and the computational cost of the whole approach in Section 4.5.
Initial tests under controlled conditions
In the first experiment, we used 4 small (thousand-edge scale) synthetic graphs to verify that the algorithm would detect locksteps only when they were really there. These are the controlled conditions of our experimentation, that is, we wanted to make sure that the algorithm would not point out suspect behaviors when we had ascertained that there were none to be detected. We generated synthetic graphs in which no products nor sets of products would configure a given suspect behavior, such as 10 pages and 25 users. We then ran ORFEL with varying parameters, including m = 5, n = 10 and m = 10, n = 25 and verified that, as expected, no lockstep was detected. The same results could be inferred from the algorithm description of Section 3.2 and from the discussion carried out in Section 3.4, still, we verified this feature empirically.
Efficacy
We define efficacy as the ability of finding the majority (> 95%) of the locksteps. To test this feature, we created controlled conditions with artificial attacks appended to our datasets that permitted us to evaluate the output of the algorithm. Algorithm 4 shows how we generated such attacks, by randomly choosing a group of pages and users and then connecting them within a limited ∆t time window. This was necessary because, since the problem is NP-hard, we would not be able to know whether the output of the algorithm is correct considering uncontrolled conditions. The problem is a variation of subspace clustering, considering the semantic that the clusters (locksteps) are unusual and, therefore, suspect. Note that we did not focus on the issue of determining whether a given suspect lockstep is actually an attack, since this is one distinct problem that demands extra information (identification, customer profile, and so on) to be evaluated by means of false-positive and true-positive rates.
Attack size
In order to analyze the ability of the algorithm to find locksteps with different sizes, we ran experiments for each of the three datasets described in Table 2 . We fixed m and n in each case while varying the sizes of the artificial attacks appended to the dataset, so that we would be able to see how effective the algorithm is, depending on the size of the attacks.
In the first experiment, we set n to 10 and m to 5 and introduced in each dataset artificial attacks with sizes varying from 10 users and 5 products to 120 users and 60 products. This allowed us to observe the percentage of attacks caught for each configuration.
In Figure 1 , one can see that the algorithm was able to detect over 95% of the attacking users for different attack sizes and different parameters. Note that we varied parameters n and m to detect more attacks of each specific size with the goal of understanding how the choice of parameters works against different attack sizes. One can see that each graphic followed a similar behavior, indicating that the percentage of users caught tends to grow with the size of the attacks, that is, the bigger the attacks are, the more likely we are to detect them with a given configuration, which intuitively makes sense.
Number of seeds
We ran the algorithm over our three test datasets; we did it 4 times for each one -as the algorithm is non-deterministic -and calculated the average response. It was a requirement that none of the 4 runs would present discrepant results; we were able to verify that since the variance of the results was at the order of 1%. We introduced 20 synthetic attacks (10 defamations and 10 illegitimate promotions) in each dataset and varied the number of seeds from 1,000 to 7,000. In Figure 2 , it is possible to see that for the smaller dataset (550 K edges) -the Amazon.FineFoods, we were able to catch over 95% of the attacks with 4,000 seeds. Interestingly, the average of attacks caught with 5,000 seeds was significantly lower, what indicates that the algorithm reached its peak performance around 4,000 seeds and only had some variation afterwards due to its non-determinism. In Figure 2 , we see that the algorithm caught over 95% of the attacks with 6,000 seeds in a dataset with 8 M edges (Amazon.Movies); and, in Figure 2 , it caught over 95% of the attacks with 7,000 seeds in a dataset with 100 M edges (Synthetic.C). We conclude that the number of seeds to reach high rates of detection goes with the data size, with a number approximate to 10 3 * log(number o f edges), which for our 3 datasets would be approximately: 5800, 6900 and 8000, respectively. From this experiment, we were able to verify that ORFEL is effective; we were able to identify more than 95% of the attacks in three datasets of different sizes. Also notice that the algorithm is flexible in relation to the attack sizes, as observed in the parameters of Figure 2 . It means that ORFEL fits the peculiarities of different domains.
Real data experimentation
We performed additional experiments in both the real datasets Amazon.Movies and Amazon.FineFoods without the inclusion of any synthetic data. For this context, we considered that a suspect behavior would be 20 users positively recommending 6 movies or food products in less than a week, which, in this semantic context, is an intense load of recommendation. We ran the algorithm and found 37 suspect attacks; we took 8 minutes to achieve convergence for the larger dataset (Amazon.Movies). Since the execution time was quite small, we were able to try variations of the desired attacks, with 15 users and 7 movies within a week, and also 10 users and 10 movies within three days. After manually analyzing the suspect locksteps, we discovered that they were caused by amazon's policy of using different identification numbers for different flavors/sizes of the same food product, and for different versions of the same movie, while merging their reviews. Although these were not actual attacks, this simple experiment revealed a behavior that should be better analyzed since the Amazon's policy could eventually lead customers to a misleading choice. In summary, we were able to identify, in a universe of 1,140,000 nodes and 8,000,000 edges, really small temporal patterns that demanded attention. We also note the reduced time to accomplish such results, what allowed us to test on different parameters according to the semantics of the dataset.
Efficiency and scalability
Given the current scale of network-like data, our method is supposed to be efficient, that is, it must handle billion-scale graphs and finish in reasonable time. We test this requirement with synthetic, benchmark datasets that are larger versions of dataset Synthetic.C. Although there are plenty of real data related to our problem (network data including edge weights and time stamps), such data is usually not shared by companies due to privacy matters.
Preprocessing
Asynchronous Parallel Processing platforms like those reviewed in Section 2.4 demand a preprocessing step in which the data is organized and formatted in accordance to the platform's paradigm. In our case, the preprocessing step converts text to binary data, then it sorts and writes the vertices so to have them read from disk with sequential scans, minimizing the number of seeks. In wall-clock time we take nearly 45 min. to preprocess 1 billion edges on a mechanical disk, and nearly 15 min. on a solid-state disk -for a given dataset, preprocessing is necessary only once, no matter how many times we shall process the data later on.
Number of edges
First we test on the number of edges of the graph as, for our algorithm, the data size is the main constraint for time scalability. In the first experiment, we ran ORFEL with 100 seeds; we took 7 time average runtime (over 3 runs) measurements with the number of edges varying from 50,000 to 1 billion. Figure 3 presents the results for the mechanical disk; clearly, one can see that the time goes linearly with the number of edges. For this configuration, the processing of 1 billion edges takes 143 min. (≈2.38 hour) over a mechanical disk, and 78 min. (≈1.3 hour) over a solid-state disk.
We argue that this performance is super-fast because the previous work (Beutel et al. [4] -Fig 4a) took ≈0.5 hour to do a similar processing with one thousand machines over MapReduce, while we used one single commodity machine. The difference of performance is because the former work executes a sequential (non-parallel) algorithm that needs to compute one seed at a time in each machine; therefore, performance came at the cost of thousand machines, each executing one instance of the computation, in a distributed environment with heavy communication demands. Differently, the design of our algorithm explored the fact that the problem can be solved considering only the neighborhood of each node, what allowed us to process the graph in parallel asynchronous mode, with multiple seeds being solved simultaneously. The performance gains were not only remarkable, they also made it possible to solve the problem in commodity hardware.
Number of seeds
We also test the runtime of the algorithm in relation to the number of seeds. We ran ORFEL over 100 million edges varying the number of seeds from 100 to 5,000. Figure 4 shows the plot for this experiment; in the figure one can see that, also in this case, the runtime scales linearly with the number of seeds. The runtime for 100 seeds is 10 min., while for 5,000 seeds it takes 298 min.; that is a 30-times increase in time for a 50-times increase in the problem input; or a slope smaller than 1 for the relationship runtime × number of seeds, just as desired.
Computational cost
Given a graph G of size D bytes, a main memory of size M bytes, and disk blocks of size b bytes; ORFEL splits the graph into P = D/M parts. Each part contains edges that are sorted in disk according to their source vertices so that the graph is processed by reading the parts once as targets and then as sources. Therefore, in order to read the entire graph, it is necessary to read B = D/b disk blocks twice, or 2B times. Besides that, for each part it is necessary to read the other P − 1 parts, what leads to P 2 disk seeks. It brings us to the total disk operation as given by P 2 disk seeks + 2B block reads per iteration.
Also, considering the ORFEL algorithm, we can see that it runs for I iterations. In each iteration, besides the disk operation, it runs once for each of the S seeds (worst case); each time, it processes all the |E| edges of the graph, which are in memory. Therefore, the processing cost of the algorithm is I * O(S * |E|).
Each iteration of the algorithm asks for a re-organization step in which the locksteps of each seed are redefined based on the results annotated at the last iteration. For I iterations, S seeds, n users and m products, this step runs at cost I * O(S * n * (m * log(m))), part of this cost is due to the operation of sorting in memory (in logarithmic time). This is the cost of the worst case, when the algorithm processes all the seeds -this number drops abruptly after a few iterations because the majority of the seeds does not grow; instead, they get stuck to a local maximum that is too small to be considered a lockstep, being dismissed for further iterations.
Finally, the total cost of ORFEL is I * (P 2 disk seeks + 2B block reads + O(S * |E|) + O(S * n * m * log(m))). Since the cost of processing is 6 orders of magnitude smaller than that of a mechanical disk and 4 orders smaller than that of a solid-state-disk, the processing cost is insignificant. As so, the computational cost of ORFEL is I * (P 2 disk seeks + 2B block reads). Note, from our analysis, that all the cost depends on the available memory, which is used as a buffer for data coming from disk; hence, all the time measurements reported in this section could be smaller if we had used more memory.
DISCUSSION AND FURTHER APPLI-CATIONS
As previously mentioned, ORFEL suits for many other problems that can be represented as graphs, lending support to further applications.
Social networks
In the case of social networks, the usual interaction is to like a given post (as for Google+ or Facebook); for this configuration, locksteps characterize solely by illegitimate promotion, when a given post (or page) gets fake likes from attackers willing to make it more relevant than it really is. According to the model of ORFEL, this problem refers to a bipartite graph in which the edges are not weighted (weight 1 for all the edges).
Journal co-citations
Given the pressure for relevance and impact, some scientific journals may use a co-citation scheme in which one journal cites the other and vice-versa, just like in the case spotted by Nature in 2013 [20] . According to this scheme, a variant of lockstep behavior, one journal tends to favor papers citing a specific other journal; and even to have editors recommend authors what to cite in their work as a condition for publication.
Identifying this kind of lockstep behavior is not trivial because systematic co-citation tends to disappear along years of publications, when such schemes are covered by the volume of legitimate citations and by the time magnitude -it is reasonable to have cocitation between any two journals in periods of 10 years, for example. The problem becomes even harder if more than two journalsthree or four -set up the scheme, when simple journal-to-journal interaction may not be sufficient to detect a scheme. In other words, the temporal factor and the volume of data make it a problem much harder than simply detecting bipartite sub graphs. This problem is another instance of the lockstep detection treated in this work. With our algorithm it is possible to spot co-citation occurring, let's say, within periods of 1 or 2 years for any number of journals. For time intervals such as those, one may suspect if a set of journals cite each other with high intensity.
For this specific case, our problem model changes a little. In our model, we assumed users recommending products -a bipartite graph; for detecting journal co-citations we must have the set of journals under investigation replicated, that is one given journal appears in the model twice: once as a citing journal and once as a cited journal, what also defines a bipartite graph as expected by our algorithm. The output of our algorithm, then, shall present sub bipartite graphs. However, different from the user-product model, it is not enough to identify sub bipartite graphs as an indication of fraud; it is also necessary to have a high similarity between the two sets of the nodes of the bipartite sub graph. This is straightly achieved with the Jaccard set similarity -Jaccard = |set 1 ∩set 2 |/|set 1 ∪set 2 |, which returns 1 if two sets are exactly the same, and 0 if they are totally different. For the co-citation problem, our algorithm could Copyright the Authors Draft submitted to the Eighth ACM WSDM Conference, 2015 be set to return the set of bipartite sub graphs ordered by their Jaccard similarity. Of course, our algorithm spots cases that are just suspicious, but that are not definitive frauds; these cases must go through human interpretation because it is expected that the journals with the highest impacts cite each other, however this is not expected in journals with lower impact rates.
Our algorithm cannot only detect suspicious co-citation cases, it can do it with high scalability. Given our processing performance, our algorithm can virtually inspect all the publication interaction ever produced in just a few hours.
CONCLUSIONS
We treated the problem of systematic attacks to defame or to promote entities that define bipartite networks, such as in the case of user-product recommendations, user-apps evaluations, or journaljournal co-citations. Such attacks are performed by means of fake users, malware credential stealing, web robots, and/or social engineering. The problem is modeled as a bipartite weighted and timestamped graph in which we want to detect temporal near-bipartite cores. The challenge here is known to be NP-hard, so that we introduced an approximate, optimization-based algorithm to solve the problem; our approach is based on vertex-centric asynchronous parallel processing. Our main contributions are:
1. Novel algorithmic paradigm: we developed the ORFEL algorithm along with a formalization of its fundaments, which include an optimization approach over a weighted and timestamped graph. To the best of our knowledge, ORFEL is the first vertex-centric algorithm able to spot lockstep behavior in Web-scale graphs using asynchronous parallel processing;
2. Scalability and accuracy: we demonstrated empirical efficacy (over 95% of detection) and superior efficiency -with a performance, in one single commodity machine, that rivals to that of previous cluster-based works with similar accuracy at the scale of billion edges;
3. Generality of scope: we were able to detect both defamation and illegitimate promotion according to a novel modeling of the problem, expanding the scope of previous works to highimpact applications, like e-commerce, scientific communities, and social networks.
Finally, we emphasize the importance of detecting lockstep behavior, either for defamation or promotion, because these frauds can harm both customers and vendors, inducing the trading of unverified products. We show the applicability of our approach in real graphs from e-commerce. We also note that the relevance of this problem is growing as the Web 2.0 is becoming popular, in which online trading and recommendation play a central role in users' habits.
